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contacted at hjacoby@worldbank.org.  
This paper documents the changing structure of wages in 
India over the post-reform era, the roughly two-decade 
period since 1993. To investigate the factors underlying 
these changes, a supply-demand framework is applied at the 
level of the Indian state. While real wages have risen across 
India over the past two decades, the increase has been greater 
in rural areas and, especially, for unskilled workers. The 
analysis finds that, in rural areas, the changing wage struc-
ture has been driven largely by relative supply factors, such 
as increased overall education levels and falling female labor 
force participation. Relative wage changes between rural and 
urban areas have been driven largely by shifts in employment, 
notably into unskilled-intensive sectors like construction. 
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I. Introduction	
We	 investigate	 changes	 in	 the	 structure	 of	wages	 in	 India	 over	 the	 post‐reform	 era,	 the	
roughly	two‐decade	period	since	1993,	paying	particular	attention	to	recent	trends	in	the	
wages	of	rural	workers,	especially	the	unskilled.		Poverty	reduction,	much	of	it	concentrated	
in	rural	areas,	has	accelerated	over	the	last	few	years,	largely	due	to	increased	earnings	from	
non‐agricultural	wage	employment	(Balcazar	et	al.	2015).			An	exploration	of	the	fine‐grained	
details	of	 India’s	 labor	market	 transformation	will	 thus	help	us	 to	better	understand	this	
poverty	decline.	
Our	approach	hews	closely	to	the	Supply‐Demand‐Institutions	(SDI)	framework	pioneered	
by	 Katz	 and	Murphy	 (1992)	 and	 Bound	 and	 Johnson	 (1992).	 	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 divide	 the	
workforce	 into	 imperfectly	 substitutable	 demographic	 groups;	 e.g.,	 by	 gender,	 education,	
and	age.		The	twist,	in	our	case,	is	to	also	cut	the	data	by	rural/urban,	recognizing	that,	to	a	
large	extent,	rural	and	urban	India	constitute	distinct	labor	markets,	or	at	least	are	far	from	
being	 perfectly	 integrated.	 	 Thus,	 our	 apparatus	 allows	 us	 to	 investigate,	 for	 example,	
changes	in	wages	of	the	rural	unskilled	relative	to	their	urban	counterparts.			
A	second	point	of	departure	 from	conventional	SDI	analysis	 is	 its	application	at	 the	state	
level,	treating	each	Indian	state	(or	group	of	states)	as	having	separate	urban	and	rural	labor	
markets.		A	state‐level	approach	provides	the	requisite	degrees	of	freedom	for	econometric	
analysis	 (see	 Juhn	 and	 Kim,	 1999,	 for	 a	 related	 study	 of	 US	 states).	 	 In	 particular,	 SDI	
decomposes	 wage	 changes	 for	 a	 group	 into	 supply	 shifts	 (changing	 group	 employment	
shares),	demand	shifts	(changing	industrial	composition	biased	for	or	against	a	group),	and	
wage‐premia	shifts	(essentially,	movements	into	or	out	of	structurally	low‐paying	jobs).		We	
then	take	the	analysis	a	step	 further	by	 investigating	the	key	state‐level	drivers	of	recent	
relative	wage	trends;	i.e.,	we	ask	what	types	of	supply	or	demand	shifts	were	particularly	
influential	in	explaining	the	changing	wage	structure	in	India	over	the	last	decade.	
There	 is	 a	 modest	 literature	 exploring	 India’s	 wage	 structure	 using	 data	 from	 NSS’s	
Employment‐Unemployment	surveys.		Hnatkovska	and	Lahiri	(2013)	consider	rural‐urban	
wage	 convergence	 in	 India	 from	 1983‐2009	 using	 a	 model	 of	 long‐run	 structural	
transformation,	but	 they	do	not	decompose	 supply	and	demand	 factors	behind	 the	more	
recent	 wage	 trends.	 	 While	 Chamarbagwala	 (2006),	 like	 us,	 uses	 a	 supply‐demand	
decomposition,	it	is	focused	on	the	impact	of	trade	liberalization	over	the	earlier	1983‐99	
period	(see	also	Azam,	2010).			
The	organization	of	the	paper	is	as	follows.		We	begin	in	Section	II	by	defining	our	groups	
and	 industries	and	then	documenting	how	real	and	relative	wages	 in	 India	have	changed	
over	the	past	two	decades.		In	Section	III,	we	review	the	SDI	framework	and	apply	it	to	the	
national	level.		Next,	we	turn	to	the	state‐level	SDI	analysis	in	Sections	IV	and	V,	followed	by	
conclusions	in	Section	VI.	
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II. Preliminaries		
A. Definitions:		groups	and	industries	
	
We	analyze	three	rounds	of	the	NSS,	the	50th	(1993‐94),	61st	(2004‐05),	and	68th	(2011‐
12),	thus	covering	an	18	year	span.		Workers	between	12	and	65	years	of	age	are	divided	
into	8	demographic	groups,	 consisting	of	 the	2x2x2	 interaction	of	male/female,	 educated	
(completed	secondary	level	or	above)/uneducated	(less	than	completed	secondary),	young	
(12‐29)/old	(30‐65).		In	addition,	we	construct	aggregates	for	these	8	demographic	groups	
by	sector	(urban/rural),	yielding	16	groups	in	total.			
	
Wage	earners	are	defined	as	those	engaged	in	“gainful	activities”,	as	recorded	in	their	“usual	
principal	status”	in	the	NSS,	but	not	self‐employed.		Usual	principal	status	also	serves	as	our	
basis	for	categorizing	individuals	into	industry	groups	below.	We	focus	on	principal	status	
because	this	accounts	for	the	preponderance	of	the	reference	period	of	365	days	preceding	
the	date	of	survey.	1	
	
Figure	1:		Relative	shares	of	demographic	groups	among	wage	earners	
	
Figure	1	shows	the	extent	to	which	each	demographic	group	is	represented	among	sector‐
specific	wage‐earners.		Of	particular	note	is	the	increasing	share	of	educated,	which	is	much	
more	pronounced	in	rural	than	in	urban	areas.		Despite	this	trend,	uneducated	males	remain	
the	dominant	group	in	rural	wage	labor	markets.	
                                                            
1 Subsidiary status is much more temporary in nature and, as NSSO suggests, only about 1.3% in the rural and 0.1% 
in the urban areas had participated in two subsidiary economic activities during the period of one year before the 
date of survey in round 55 (NSSO, 2008). 
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We	next	define	five	broad	“industry”	or	occupational	categories:	(1)	agriculture	(inclusive	of	
forestry	and	fishery);	(2)	construction;	(3)	manufacturing	(inclusive	of	mining	and	utilities);	
(4)	Professional	(including	public	administration);	(5)	services	(inclusive	of	wholesale/retail	
trade	 and	 domestic	 service).2	 	 SDI	 analyses	 using	 developed	 country	 data,	 and	 even	
Chamarbagwala’s	 (2006)	 study	 of	 urban	 Indian	 wages,	 typically	 use	 a	 much	 more	 fine‐
grained	industrial	classification.		However,	sample	size	considerations	constrain	us	to	only	
five.		Rural	India	is	predominately	agricultural;	manufacturing,	in	particular,	has	until	very	
recently	accounted	for	much	less	than	ten	percent	of	rural	employment.		Given	the	typical	
NSS	sample,	there	would	simply	not	be	enough	wage‐earners	in	each	category	to	support	a	
very	detailed	classification.		This	concern	is	only	reinforced	in	our	state‐level	analysis,	where	
state‐wise	wage‐earner	samples	are	much	smaller.	
	
	
	
	
1993‐94	 2004‐05	 2011‐12	
	
	
Figure	2:	Share	of	industries	in	Rural‐Urban	employment	
	
	
                                                            
2 See Appendix Table B.1 for details on how industry codes were harmonized across NSS rounds. 
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Patterns	of	industrial	employment	have	changed	rather	dramatically	in	rural	India	over	the	
past	two	decades.		As	seen	in	Figure	2,	from	around	three‐quarters	in	the	early‐1990s,	the	
share	of	rural	labor	employed	in	agriculture	had,	by	2011,	declined	to	around	one‐half.		The	
two	 main	 rural	 growth	 industries	 are	 services	 and	 construction,	 with	 the	 latter’s	
employment	share	more	than	quadrupling	over	the	last	two	decades.		By	contrast,	the	urban	
picture	is	one	of	relative	stasis,	with	more	modest	expansions	of	services	and	construction	
over	the	same	period.	
	
Rural	 Urban	
Figure	3:		Share	of	demographic	group	in	each	industry	
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Representation	of	the	8	demographic	groups	in	each	industry	is	shown	for	both	rural	and	
urban	 areas	 in	 Figure	 3.	 	 Educated	 workers,	 obviously,	 predominate	 in	 the	 professions,	
whereas	wage‐jobs	in	rural	construction	are	largely	held	by	unskilled	males,	even	more	so	
than	in	agriculture	and	quite	substantially	more	so	than	in	services.		Both	rural	and	urban	
areas	have	seen	a	gradual	up‐skilling	of	the	workforce	over	the	past	two	decades,	across	all	
industrial	sectors.	
	
B. 	Changes	in	real	wages	
Information	on	weekly	wage	earnings	and	days	worked	per	week	is	available	for	regular	and	
casual	workers.	 In	 the	case	of	 those	who	perform	multiple	 jobs	 in	the	week,	we	calculate	
average	daily	wages	by	dividing	weekly	wage	income	from	all	sources	by	total	number	of	
days	worked.	 	 To	 compute	 real	 wages,	 we	 use	 the	 state‐level	 Consumer	 Price	 Index	 for	
Agriculture	(CPI‐AL)	and	Industrial	Workers	(CPI‐IW).	Originally,	the	CPI‐AL	was	available	
with	base‐year	1986‐87	and	CPI‐IW	with	base‐year	1982.	We	 converted	 these	 indices	 to	
have	a	uniform	base‐year	2004‐05.		CPI‐AL	is	used	to	deflate	wages	in	rural	areas	and	CPI‐
IW	in	urban	India.		Because	these	deflators	are	not	available	for	some	of	the	small	states,	we	
used	available	information	for	larger	states	either	adjacent	to	them	or	from	which	they	had	
been	split	(see	Appendix	Table	B.2	for	details	on	the	CPI	calculation	for	the	smaller	states).				
Figure	4:	Annual	average	real	wage	changes	by	demographic	group	
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Mean	annualized	changes	in	log	real	wages	by	group	are	shown	in	Figure	4	across	each	of	the	
two	sub‐periods.		Evidently,	wages	have	been	rising	in	real	terms	over	the	past	two	decades	
for	all	groups	and	especially	in	rural	areas.	 	There	has	also	been	a	marked	acceleration	 in	
wage‐growth	in	recent	years,	most	pronounced	in	urban	India	as	well	as	among	the	unskilled	
(those	with	less	than	secondary	education).		Looking	across	states	(Figure	5),	we	see	big	real‐
wage	gains	for	unskilled	workers	in	the	south	and	east	of	the	country,	with	W.	Bengal	being	
a	notable	exception.		The	remainder	of	our	analysis	will	largely	ignore	this	overall	rising‐tide	
to	focus	on	why	some	“boats”	have	risen	faster	than	others.	
	
	
	
Figure	5:	Annual	average	real	wage	changes	for	unskilled	labor	by	state	
	
	
	
C. 	Changes	in	relative	wages	within	and	across	sectors	
For	ease	of	presentation	under	the	first	major	column	heading	of	Table	1,	we	aggregate	mean	
relative	wage	changes	across	pairs	of	demographic	groups	using	the	respective	(base‐year)	
shares	 of	wage‐earners	 as	weights.	 	 Thus,	 for	 example,	 the	 change	 in	 the	wage	 for	 rural	
educated	males	relative	to	rural	uneducated	males	is	computed	as	a	weighted	average	of	the	
corresponding	 mean	 wage	 changes	 for	 old	 and	 young	 rural	 males	 in	 each	 of	 these	
educational	categories.	
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Table	1:	 	SDI	decomposition	of	relative	wage	changes	within	rural	and	urban	 India
	
	
The	 first	 two	 rows	 of	 Table	 1	 (denominated	 in	 log	 changes)	 indicate	 that	 the	 wages	 of	
uneducated	 rural	 workers	 rose	 relative	 to	 those	 of	 educated	 rural	 workers	 (hence	 the	
negative	sign)	for	both	males	and	females.		Much	of	these	relative	gains	occurred	in	the	most	
recent	decade	(2004‐11).		Note	that	the	urban	unskilled	also	experienced	relative	wage	gains	
in	the	second	period,	but	not	quite	as	much	as	their	rural	counterparts.		Overall,	rural	females	
(especially	the	unskilled)	gained	ground	on	rural	males	in	the	last	decade.	
	
Table	2:		SDI	decomposition	of	relative	wage	changes	between	rural	and	urban	India 
 
 
	
Looking	across	the	urban‐rural	divide	in	Table	2,	the	striking	pattern	is	wage	convergence,	
albeit	skewed	toward	the	unskilled.	 	Overall,	wages	for	uneducated	males	rose	by	around	
47%	relative	to	their	urban	counterparts;	the	corresponding	figure	for	uneducated	females	
is	37%.		However,	much	of	these	gains	occurred	in	the	earlier	decade	of	the	post‐reform	era,	
especially	for	males.		Similar,	but	substantially	smaller,	relative	gains	were	experienced	by	
educated	rural	workers.		Aggregating	across	groups,	rural	wages	rose	a	modest	9%	relative	
to	urban	wages	over	the	last	decade,	following	a	27%	increase	in	the	first	decade.	
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
Educated/uneducated Male -0.09 -0.24 -0.33 0.50 0.41 0.91 -0.29 -0.37 -0.64 -0.08 0.03 -0.01
Female -0.10 -0.31 -0.41 0.82 0.70 1.51 -0.15 -0.03 -0.27 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09
Old/Young Male 0.10 -0.06 0.04 0.11 0.30 0.41 0.25 0.11 0.38 0.00 -0.07 -0.07
Female 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.37 0.38 0.75 0.07 0.00 0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.02
Male/Female 0.13 -0.15 -0.01 -0.06 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.47 0.41 -0.13 0.11
Educated/uneducated Male 0.11 -0.13 -0.03 0.07 0.32 0.38 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.22 0.01 -0.15
Female 0.04 -0.17 -0.13 -0.03 0.43 0.40 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.23 -0.05 -0.19
Old/Young Male 0.10 -0.16 -0.06 0.07 0.24 0.32 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 -0.08 -0.19
Female 0.01 -0.16 -0.15 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 -0.02 -0.12
Male/Female 0.03 -0.14 -0.11 -0.17 0.15 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.25 -0.07 0.05
Urban/Rural -0.27 -0.09 -0.36 0.28 0.20 0.48 -0.35 -0.24 -0.60 -0.08 -0.12 -0.17
Relative wage Supply Demand Institution
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2004-05
2004-05 to 
2011-12
1993-94 to 
2011-12
Urban / RuraL Educated Male -0.17 0.01 -0.16 -0.38 -0.20 -0.57 ‐0.22 ‐0.11 ‐0.30 -0.21 -0.12 -0.26
Female -0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.73 -0.25 -0.99 ‐0.03 ‐0.02 ‐0.05 -0.08 -0.12 -0.18
Urban/ Rural uneducated Male -0.37 -0.10 -0.47 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 ‐0.45 ‐0.37 ‐0.77 -0.07 -0.10 -0.13
Female -0.21 -0.16 -0.37 0.12 0.01 0.13 ‐0.17 ‐0.04 ‐0.28 0.08 -0.15 -0.08
Urban /Rural old Male -0.29 -0.09 -0.38 0.06 0.01 0.07 ‐0.52 ‐0.37 ‐0.89 -0.19 -0.10 -0.22
Female -0.16 -0.12 -0.29 0.05 0.14 0.19 ‐0.19 ‐0.04 ‐0.32 0.00 -0.17 -0.16
Urban / Rural Young Male -0.28 0.00 -0.28 0.10 0.07 0.16 ‐0.27 ‐0.22 ‐0.46 -0.06 -0.09 -0.11
Female -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.29 0.40 0.69 ‐0.13 ‐0.03 ‐0.23 0.06 -0.12 -0.06
Urban/Rural Male -0.35 -0.08 -0.44 0.09 0.00 0.09 ‐0.43 ‐0.32 ‐0.73 -0.15 -0.10 -0.19
Female -0.25 -0.09 -0.34 0.20 0.19 0.39 ‐0.17 ‐0.04 ‐0.28 0.01 -0.16 -0.13
Urban/Rural -0.27 -0.09 -0.36 0.28 0.20 0.48 ‐0.35 ‐0.24 -0.60 -0.08 -0.12 -0.17
Relative wage Supply  Demand Institution
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III. Supply,	Demand,	Institutions		
A. 	Conceptual	framework	
	
Suppose	we	have	a	CES	production	function	for	aggregate	output	that	depends	on	just	two	
types	of	labor	(ignore	capital),	types	a	and	b.		Katz	and	Autor	(1999),	e.g.,	show	that	
	
log ቀ௪ೌ೟௪್೟ቁ ൌ
ଵ
ఙ ሾܦ௧ െ ܵ௧ሿ,	 	 	 	 	 (1)	
	
where	ݓ௜௧	are	wages	for	type	 i	 in	time	t,	ܦ௧	 is	an	index	of	relative	demand	shifts	favoring	
group	a,	and	 ܵ௧	 is	 an	 index	 of	 relative	 supply	 shifts	 favoring	 group	a.	 	 The	 parameter	 ߪ	
represents	the	aggregate	elasticity	of	substitution	in	production	between	labor	of	type	a	and	
b.	 	A	key	implication	of	the	model	is	that	only	net	demand	shifts	(i.e.,	net	of	supply	shifts)	
matter	for	relative	wages.		Differencing	equation	(1)	over	time,	using	the	notation	∆x௧ ൌ x௧ െ
x௧ି௟,	delivers		
	
∆log ቀ௪ೌ೟௪್೟ቁ ൌ
ଵ
ఙ ሾ∆ܦ௧ െ ∆ܵ௧ሿ.	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
Thus,	on	the	left‐hand	side	of	equation	(2)	we	have	a	difference‐in‐difference	in	mean	log‐
wage	for	two	groups	over	time.3		These	diff‐in‐diffs	are	precisely	what	is	reported	in	Tables	
1	and	2	for,	respectively,	within	and	between	sector	contrasts.	
We	may	write	the	relative	supply	for	group	i	in	sector	s	at	time	t	as		
௜ܵ௦௧ ൌ log	ሺே೔ೞ೟ேೞ೟ ሻ	 	 	 	 	 (3)	
	
where	ܰ ௜௦௧	is	the	group’s	employment	in	the	sector	and	ܰ ௦௧	is	total	employment	in	the	sector.		
Note	that	employment	includes	self‐employment	in	agriculture	or	in	a	household	enterprise	
and	hence	 the	employed	are	a	much	 larger	set	 than	wage‐earners,	especially	 in	 the	rural	
sector.	 	 Shifts	 in	 supply,	 ∆ ௜ܵ௦௧,	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 predetermined;	 that	 is,	 not	 caused	 by	
changes	in	relative	wages.		In	the	state‐level	analysis	we	will	have	the	opportunity	to	test	this	
assumption.	
	
                                                            
3 With	more	than	two	types	of	imperfectly	substitutable	labor,	the	change	in	relative	wages	between	any	two	
groups	will	 also	 depend	 on	 how	 each	 of	 their	 net	 demands	 shift	 relative	 to	 that	 of	 the	 other	 groups.	 	 For	
simplicity,	our	analysis	ignores	such	cross‐price	effects;	i.e.,	we	implicitly	assume	that	the	matrix	of	elasticities	
of	complementarity	is	diagonal.	
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Theoretically	consistent	measurement	of	demand	shifts	is	a	complicated	issue	(see	Katz	and	
Autor,	 1999;	 Bound	 and	 Johnson,	 1992).	 	We	 follow	 Juhn	 and	 Kim	 (1999),	 who	 use	 the	
between	(industrial)	sector	demand	shift	measure	of	Katz	and	Murphy	(1992),4	
	
∆ܦ௜௦௧ ൌ ∑ ே೔ೖೞ೟ேೖೞ೟ ∆log	ሺ
ேೖೞ೟
ேೞ೟ ሻ௞ 	 	 	 	 	 (4)	
	
where	݇	indexes	industry.		So,	the	first	term	in	the	sum	is	the	share	of	demographic	group	݅	
in	industry	݇’s	employment	and	the	second	term	is	the	growth	rate	in	the	share	of	industry	
݇	 	 employment	 in	 overall	 sectoral	 employment.	 	 Intuitively,	 ∆ܦ௜௦௧	 is	 larger	 when	
demographic	group	݅	(initially)	predominates	in	relatively	fast‐growing	industries.		As	with	
supply	shifts,	∆ܦ௜௦௧	is	taken	as	exogenous	with	respect	to	changes	in	relative	wage	structure;	
again,	this	is	testable.	
	
The	“institutions”	component	of	SDI	boils	down	to	allowing	 for	 industry	wage	premia.	 	A	
wage	premium	measures	the	extent	to	which	a	given	type	of	worker	(demographic	group)	is	
paid	more	(or	less)	when	working	in	a	particular	industry.		Labor	market	institutions	matter	
insofar	as	wages	are	not	determined	solely	by	the	interaction	of	skill	endowments	and	skill	
prices—i.e.,	by	the	competitive	market	for	skills.	 	A	salient	example	in	the	case	of	India	is	
agricultural	labor.		On	average,	jobs	in	agriculture	pay	around	a‐third	less	than	those	outside	
of	agriculture,	holding	 location	and	type	of	worker	constant.	 	Why	this	premium	arises	 is	
beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	investigation,	but	it	may	have	something	to	do	with	the	fact	
that	a	higher	proportion	of	agricultural	than	nonagricultural	workers	in	India	are	hired	on	a	
casual	daily	basis	(see	Appendix	Table	B.3	for	details).		
Following	Bound	&	Johnson	(1992),	then,	let	
logሺ ௜ܹ௦௧ሻ ൌ log൫ ௜ܹ௦௧௖ 	൯ ൅ ∑ ߩ௜௦௞௧߮௜௦௞௧௞ 	 	 	 	 (5)	
	
where	 ௜ܹ௦௧௖ 	is	the	competitive	market	wage	given	group	݅	skills,	ߩ௜௦௞௧	is	the	industry	݇	wage	
premium	for	group	݅	at	time	ݐ,	and	߮௜௦௞௧ ൌ ௜ܰ௦௞௧ ௜ܰ௦௧⁄ 	is	the	proportion	of	group	݅	workers	in	
industry	݇.		Based	on		ߩ௜௦௞௧	estimated	from	wage	regressions,	the	institutions	index	(∆ܫ)	for	
group	݅	is	the	change	in	the	entire	wage‐premium	term	or		
	
∆ܫ௜௦௧ ൌ ∑ ሾ∆ߩ௜௦௞௧߮௜௦௞௧ି௟ ൅ ߩ௜௦௞௧ି௟∆߮௜௦௞௧ሿ௞ 	 	 	 	 (6)	
		
Returning	to	the	case	of	the	negative	wage	premium	in	India’s	agricultural	sector,	we	can	see	
that	a	group	with	a	higher	∆ܫ௜௦௧	is	one	which	is	moving	out	of	agriculture	relatively	quickly.			
                                                            
4 Another measure of demand shifts involves a weighted average of within industry changes in group employment 
shares, but we do not focus on it here for reasons discussed in the Appendix. 
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Comparison	 of	 group‐shares	 across	 NSS	 rounds,	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 6,	 indicates	 that	
uneducated	rural	males	(young	and	old)	are	shifting	out	of	agriculture	most	rapidly.	
	
Figure 6: Industry share of employment by demographic group 
	
B. All‐India	decomposition	
	
SDI	metrics	 at	 the	 national	 level	 are	 reported	 under,	 respectively,	 the	 second,	 third	 and	
fourth	major	column	headings	of	Table	1.		So,	why	did	the	wages	of	educated	workers	decline	
relative	to	the	wages	of	uneducated	workers	in	rural	India?		First	off,	there	was	a	substantial	
increase	in	relative	supply	of	educated	workers,	especially	for	females,	spread	rather	evenly	
across	 the	 two	 sub‐periods.	 	 Meanwhile,	 relative	 demand	 for	 educated	 workers	 fell,	
especially	for	males.	 	And,	finally,	there	were	modest	declines	in	the	institutions	index	for	
educated	relative	to	uneducated	workers.		In	other	words,	uneducated	workers	moved	out	
of	(low‐paid)	agricultural	labor	faster	than	educated	workers.		Similar,	but	less	pronounced,	
patterns	are	seen	for	educated	vs.	uneducated	workers	in	urban	India	(rows	6	and	7).	
	
In	Table	2,	we	compute	urban	vs.	rural	SDI	changes.		Focusing	on	unskilled	labor,	we	see	that	
shifts	 in	 relative	 supply	were	not	 a	 decisive	 factor	 behind	 the	wage	 gains	 of	 uneducated	
workers	 vis‐a‐vis	 the	 educated.	 	 There	were,	 however,	 big	 drops	 in	 relative	 demand	 for	
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unskilled	 male	 labor	 in	 urban	 areas,	 with	 smaller	 declines	 in	 the	 case	 of	 females.	 	 The	
institutions	index	also	moved	against	the	urban	unskilled.		The	story	of	wage	gains	by	the	
rural	unskilled	relative	to	their	urban	counterparts	is,	therefore,	one	of	changing	patterns	of	
industrial	employment	rather	than	one	of	changing	relative	supplies	(as	was	the	case	within	
the	rural	sector).	
	
IV. 	State‐level	SDI	Analysis	
We	now	compute	changes	in	mean	log	wages,	∆ ௜ܵ௦௧,	∆ܦ௜௦௧,	and	∆ܫ௜௦௧	separately	for	each	major	
state	or	group	of	adjacent	states.5		Our	“data	set”,	therefore,	consists	of	448	=	2	x	2	x	8	x	14	
observations	for	2	decadal	intervals,	2	sectors	(rural/urban),	8	demographic	groups,	and	14	
states.		Note	that	in	treating	a	state	as,	for	all	intents	and	purposes,	a	distinct	labor	market,	
we	are	assuming	that	changes	in,	say,	 labor	supply	within	a	given	state	are	not	driven	by	
inter‐state	migration.	 	 This	 assumption	 seems	 reasonable	 as	 a	 first	 approximation	 given	
India’s	historically	low	mobility	(see	Hnatkovska	and	Lahiri,	2013).	
Figure	7:		Bivariate	relationship	between	state/group	wage	changes	and	supply	shifts	
	
	
	
                                                            
5 State	groups	consist	of	Chhattisgarh	with	Madhya	Pradesh	(called	Madhya	Pradesh);	Uttaranchal	with	UP	(called	Uttar	
Pradesh);	Jharkhand	with	Bihar	(called	Bihar);	Seven	Sisters	in	the	Northeast	with	Sikkim	(called	seven	sisters);	Goa,	D	&	
N	Havelli,	D&	Diu	with	Maharashtra;	A&N	Island	with	West	Bengal	(called	West	Bengal);	Lakshadweep	with	Kerala	(called	
Kerala)	and	Pondicherry	with	Tamil	Nadu	(called	Tamil	Nadu).	 	Finally,	Haryana,	Punjab,	Himachal	Pradesh,	Delhi,	and	
Chandigarh	and	combined	into	Northern	states.	
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Figure	8:		Bivariate	relationship	between	state/group	wage	changes	and	demand	shifts.	
	
	
Bivariate	 scatterplots	 (fig.	7)	 reveal	 that	 increases	 in	 supply	are	 strongly	associated	with	
wage	declines	in	each	period.		Increases	in	demand,	by	contrast,	are	associated	with	wage	
increases	(fig.	8).	 	This	is	all	as	it	should	be,	but	to	properly	assess	the	SDI	framework	we	
need	to	control	for	both	supply	and	demand	shifts	simultaneously.			
	
To	do	so,	we	run	a	series	of	 regressions	of	state	mean	 log‐wage	changes	on	 the	SDI	shift	
variables.		The	first	such	regression,	shown	in	Table	3,	uses	the	full	dataset,	thus	including	
log‐wage	changes	between	1993‐2004	and	2004‐2011.		Among	the	independent	variables	is	
a	dummy	for	the	second	decadal	change.		Results	in	the	first	column	of	Table	3	show	that	
increases	in	supply	lead	to	lower	wages,	conditional	on	the	demand	shift.		Likewise,	increases	
in	demand	increase	wages,	conditional	on	the	supply	shift.		Moreover,	we	cannot	reject	the	
null	hypothesis	that	the	coefficient	on	supply	is	equal	to	minus	the	coefficient	on	demand;	
i.e.,	that	only	net	demand	shifts	matter	for	wages	(cf.,	equation	(1)).	
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Table	3:	Regression	Analysis	
	 	 2004/05	‐	2011/12	only	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
VARIABLES	 OLS	 OLS	 IV	 IV	
Δsupply	 ‐0.218***	 ‐0.262***	 ‐0.294***	 	
	 (0.031)	 (0.037)	 (0.039)	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Δdemand	 0.120**	 0.137	 0.335***	 	
	 (0.054)	 (0.112)	 (0.091)	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Δ(Demand‐Supply)	 	 	 	 0.312***	
	 	 	 	 (0.042)	
	 	 	 	 	
Industry	Effect	 ‐0.011	 0.054	 0.028	 0.031	
	 (0.047)	 (0.054)	 (0.138)	 (0.131)	
	 	 	 	 	
ΔSupply	=	‐	ΔDemand	(p‐value)	 0.18	 0.35	 0.71	 	
Year	FE	 Y	 N	 N	 N	
Observations	 448	 224	 224	 224	
R‐squared	 0.132	 0.251	 0.196	 0.202	
Notes:		Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	clustered	on	state	(***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1).		Dependent	
variable	in	all	regression	is	mean	log	wage	change	of	demographic	group	in	state.	
	
Next,	we	 address	 the	 simultaneity	 between	wage	 changes	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 demand	
and/or	supply	shifts	on	the	other.		Do		∆ ௜ܵ௦௧,	∆ܦ௜௦௧,	and,	for	that	matter,	∆ܫ௜௦௧	cause	wages	to	
change,	or	 is	 it	 the	other	way	around?	 	Arguably,	 the	supply	of	skills	and	the	structure	of	
industrial	 employment	 are	 slow	 to	 adjust	 and	 may	 reasonably	 be	 thought	 of	 as	
predetermined.	 	However,	to	test	this	proposition,	we	instrument	∆ ௜ܵ௦௧,	∆ܦ௜௦௧	and	∆ܫ௜௦௧	by	
their	lagged	values	∆ ௜ܵ௦௧ି௟,	∆ܦ௜௦௧ି௟	and	∆ܫ௜௦௧ି௟.		The	idea	here	is	that	lagged	changes	reflect	
long‐run	trends,	uncontaminated	by	contemporaneous	wage	shocks.		Of	course,	using	lags	
as	instruments	requires	us	to	drop	the	first	decadal	change,	which	corresponds	to	half	our	
sample.	 	Hence,	 in	column	2	we	replicate	our	original	OLS	specification	on	 the	sample	of	
second‐decadal	 changes,	with	 very	 similar	 results.	 	 IV	 estimates	 are	 shown	 in	 column	3.		
There	is	little	evidence	of	endogeneity	bias;	to	be	sure,	the	coefficient	on	demand	shifts	more	
than	 doubles	 from	 its	 OLS	 magnitude,	 but	 this	 could	 be	 due	 to	 chance.	 	 And,	 the	 null	
hypothesis	of	the	SDI	framework	fares	extremely	well	in	this	specification.		Thus,	in	column	
(4),	we	report	the	same	IV	specification	but	with	the	SDI	restriction	imposed,	which	is	to	say	
that	 only	 net	 demand	 shifts	 ∆ܦ௜௦௧ െ ∆ ௜ܵ௦௧	 are	 now	 included	 along	 with	 ∆ܫ௜௦௧.	 	 In	 all	
specifications,	the	coefficient	on	the	institutions	index	∆ܫ௜௦௧	is	not	significantly	different	from	
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zero.	 	Finally,	we	run	the	same	set	of	regressions	with	state	 fixed	effects	and	obtain	very	
similar	results	(see	Appendix	Table	B.4).	
	
V. SDI	Drivers		across	States	
	
The	diagnostics	of	the	previous	section	suggest	that	the	SDI	framework	does	a	reasonably	
good	job	explaining	wage	growth	of	the	past	decade	across	both	demographic	groups	and	
states.		But	what	are	the	key	structural	trends	underlying	these	changes?		Five	candidates	for	
consideration	 are:	 (1)	 Urbanization;	 (2)	 NREGA;	 (3)	 the	 rural	 construction	 “boom”;	 (4)	
falling	rural	female	LFP;	(5)	Rising	agricultural	prices.			
	
We	begin	by	predicting	log‐wage	changes	from	2004‐2011	for	each	group	x	state	observation	
using	the	results	in	Table	3,	column	4;	i.e.,	
	
∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௦௧ሻ෣ ൌ ߚመ଴ ൅ ߚመଵሺ∆ܦ௜௦௧ െ ∆ ௜ܵ௦௧ሻ ൅ ߚመଶ∆ܫ௜௦௧.	 	 	 (7)	
	
Next,	we	construct	predicted	differences‐in‐differences	across	groups	i	and	j	within	a	sector	
as	follows	
	
∆పఫ∆݈݋݃ሺ ௦ܹ௧ሻ෣ ൌ ∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௦௧ሻ෣ െ∆݈݋݃൫ ఫܹ௦௧൯෣ 	 	 	 	 (8)	
	
or	across	sectors	within	group	i	using	
	
∆௨௥∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௧ሻ෣ ൌ ∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௨௧ሻ෣ െ∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௥௧ሻ෣ 	,	 	 	 (9)	
	
where	 subscripts	u	and	 r	denote,	 respectively,	 urban	 and	 rural.	 	 Finally,	we	examine	 the	
bivariate	associations	between	the	predicted	D‐in‐Ds	and	each	of	the	five	structural	wage	
drivers	mentioned	above.	
	
	
A. 	Within	rural	India	
	
We	look	first	at	rural	areas	and,	in	particular,	at	wages	of	educated	rural	workers	(old/young	
and	male/female	 taken	 together)	 relative	 to	uneducated.	 	Each	panel	of	 figure	9	shows	a	
scatterplot	of	∆௘ௗ,௨௡௘ௗ∆݈݋݃ሺ ௥ܹ௧ሻ෣ 	against	 a	 relevant	driver.	 	Having	now	aggregated	wage	
changes	across	all	8	demographic	groups,	we	end	up	with	14	data	points,	which	is	to	say	one	
∆௘ௗ,௨௡௘ௗ∆݈݋݃ሺ ௥ܹ௧ሻ෣ 	for	each	state‐group.	
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Consider	the	change	in	the	employment	share	of	construction	in	rural	areas	of	each	of	the	14	
state‐groups.	 	 The	 top	 left	 panel	 of	 Figure	 9	 shows	 that	 higher	 construction	 shares	 are	
strongly	positively	associated	with	the	predicted	growth	in	wages	for	the	uneducated	relative	
to	educated.		Indeed,	differences	in	construction	industry	growth	explain	about	two‐thirds	of	
the	variation	in	the	relative	wage	growth	predicted	by	the	SDI	framework.		The	same	exercise	
using	 the	 rural	 services	 share,	 an	 industry	 which	 also	 employs	 significant	 numbers	 of	
unskilled	workers	and	which	also	expanded	in	relative	terms	over	the	last	decade,	shows	a	
similar	pattern	but	a	weaker	association	with	wages.		In	sum,	the	rural	construction	boom	
appears	to	have	been	an	important,	if	not	the	main,	driver	of	unskilled	relative	wage‐growth	
within	rural	India.	
	
Figure	9:		Drivers	of	changes	in	educated	vs.	uneducated	wages	within	rural	India	
	
	
It	 is	 interesting	to	contrast	the	 labor	market	 impacts	of	 the	above	compositional	shifts	 to	
those	of	NREG	(National	Rural	Employment	Guarantee).		Phase‐in	of	NREG	began	at	around	
the	mid‐point	of	our	2004‐2011	window.		Analyses	of	NSS	data	preceding	the	68th	(2011‐12)	
round	provide	mixed	evidence	as	to	the	rural	wage	impacts	of	NREG	expansion	(see	Azam,	
2012;	 Zimmerman,	 2013;	 Imbert	 and	 Papp,	 2015).	 	 However,	 NSS68,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	
provides	 individual	 level	 data	 on	 NREG	 registration	 (job‐card	 holding)	 and	 take‐up	 (i.e.,	
NREG	employment	in	the	last	12	months).	 	This	allows	us	to	construct,	for	each	state,	the	
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proportion	of	 each	demographic	group	 that	 are	 job‐card	holders	or	who	have	worked	 in	
NREG.			
	
Figure	10:	State‐wise	NREG	participation	in	rural	India,	2011‐12.	
	
Figure	11:	Group‐wise	NREG	participation	in	rural	India,	2011‐12.	
	
Looking	across	state‐groups	 in	 figure	10,	 there	are	huge	differences	 in	NREG	registration	
rates,	with	Rajasthan	and	MP	topping	the	list,	although	rates	of	participation	in	this	massive	
public	works	program	are	actually	highest	in	the	far	east	of	India	(“Seven	Sister”	states).		Also	
relevant	for	our	analysis	is	the	large	registration	and	participation	gap	between	the	educated	
and	uneducated,	with	much	higher	NREG	involvement	among	the	latter	(figure	11).		Thus,	
we	have	in	the	two	bottom	panels	of	figure	9,	plots	of	the	predicted	log‐wage	D‐in‐D	against	
the	state‐wise	differences	in	NREG	participation	shares	(job‐card	on	the	left;	worker	on	the	
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right)	between	educated	and	uneducated	groups.	 	Given	Figure	11,	all	of	 the	NREG	share	
differences	are	negative	(educated	have	lower	registration	and	take‐up	than	uneducated).		
What	we	do	not	see	is	much	of	a	relationship	between	NREG	participation	and	wage	growth	
(the	slopes	are	positive,	but	 the	R2s	are	essentially	zero).	 	Put	differently,	states	 in	which	
NREG	has	 (presumably)	expanded	 relative	employment	opportunities	 for	unskilled	 labor	
more	do	not	appear	 to	have	experienced	differential	growth	 in	net	demand	 for	unskilled	
labor.		This	is,	of	course,	not	to	say	that	NREG	has	been	ineffectual	as	a	safety‐net	for	the	poor,	
only	that	it	is	evidently	too	small	of	a	labor	market	intervention	to	have	detectable	general	
equilibrium	effects.6		
	
Next,	using	the	same	approach,	we	consider	what	has	been	driving	changes	in	relative	wages	
of	 men	 versus	 women	 in	 rural	 India	 over	 the	 last	 decade.	 	 In	 this	 case,	 we	 compute	
∆௠,௙∆݈݋݃ሺ ௥ܹ௧ሻ෣ 	by	aggregating	wage	changes	for	all	male	(m)	and	female	(f)	demographic	
groups	within	the	rural	sector	of	each	state.		Here	we	introduce	another	potentially	relevant	
factor,	 the	 change	 in	 female	 labor	 force	 participation	 (LFP).	 	 Figure	 12	 shows	 massive	
declines	in	female	LFP	in	rural	areas	of	most	states,	whereas	figure	13	shows	much	more	
muted	ones	in	the	corresponding	urban	areas.	
	
	
	
Figure	12:	Female	labor	force	participation	in	rural	India	
	
	
                                                            
6 We have done a similar analysis using “raw”, as opposed to predicted (by SDI), wage changes with the same 
result.   
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Figure	13:	Female	labor	force	participation	in	urban	India	
	
The	top	left	panel	of	figure	14	provides	striking	confirmation	that	this	recent	movement	of	
women	out	of	the	rural	labor	force	explains	much	of	the	predicted	increase	in	their	wages	
relative	to	those	of	men;	the	R2	of	the	associated	bivariate	regression	is	0.84.		By	contrast,	
changes	 in	 the	 rural	 construction	 share	 (top	 right	 panel)	 or	 in	women’s	 participation	 in	
NREG	relative	to	men’s	(bottom	panels)	explain	next	to	nothing.	
	
	
Figure	14:		Drivers	of	changes	in	male	vs.	female	wages	within	rural	India.	
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
N
orthern States
Rajasthan
U
ttar Pradesh
Bihar
W
est Bengal
O
rissa
M
adhya Pradesh
Gujarat
M
aharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Tam
il N
adu
Seven Sisters
Fe
m
al
e L
FP
R
1993‐94 2004‐05 2011‐12
Northern States
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
West Bengal
Orissa
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Seven Sisters
R-sq=.84
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
-1 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0
diff. log female LFP 68-61
Northern States
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
West Bengal
Orissa
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Seven Sisters
R-sq=0
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.4 .6 .8 1
diff. log rural construction share 68-61
Northern States
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
West Bengal
Orissa
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Seven Sisters
R-sq=0
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
-.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0
diff. share NREG job-card male/fem 68
Northern States
Rajasthan
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
West Bengal
Orissa
Madhya Pradesh
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Seven Sisters
R-sq=0
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
-.6 -.4 -.2 0
diff. share NREG worker male/fem 68
diff. log rel. wage male to female 68-61 Fitted values
20 
 
	
	
B. 	Urban	vs.	rural	India	
In	the	remainder	of	our	analysis,	we	contrast	urban	and	rural	wage	changes	 for	unskilled	
labor.		In	particular,	we	use	equation	(9)	to	compute	∆௨௥∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௧ሻ෣ 	separately	for	uneducated	
males	(figure	15)	and	for	uneducated	females	(figure	16).		On	the	x‐axis	in	each	panel	in	the	
next	two	figures	is	the	urban‐rural	difference	in	log	shares	of	construction	employment	(top	
left),	services	employment	(top	right),	and	female	LFP	(as	a	share	of	all	females	of	working	
age).		The	bottom	right	panel	of	each	of	the	figures	considers	the	change	in	the	urban	(state)	
population	 share	between	 the	2001	and	2011	population	 censuses	 (see	 figure	B.1	 in	 the	
appendix).	
	
	
Figure	15:		Drivers	of	changes	in	urban	vs.	rural	wages	for	males.	
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Figure	16:		Drivers	of	changes	in	urban	vs.	rural	wages	for	females.	
	
For	males,	the	construction	sector	stands	out	as	the	key	relative	wage	driver,	with	higher	
construction	growth	strongly	associated	with	higher	wage	growth	(R2=0.34),	whereas	for	
females	the	corresponding	association	is	actually	negative,	albeit	weak	(R2=0.05).		Relative	
growth	in	the	service	sector,	by	contrast,	bears	little	relationship	to	relative	wage	changes	
for	either	males	or	females.		As	for	female	LFP,	we	again	see	a	strong	correlation	with	wage	
growth.	 	 In	 states	 where	 women	 have	 withdrawn	 from	 the	 labor	 force	 faster	 in	 the	
countryside	 than	 in	 cities,	 rural	 wages	 of	 females	 have	 risen	 faster	 than	 urban	 wages	
(R2=0.31),	a	pattern		essentially	absent	with	respect	to	male	wages	(R2=0.04).	
	
Next,	we	ask	whether	the	growth	of	cities	has	in	and	of	itself	led	to	changes	in	SDI	at	the	state	
level.		By	far	the	fastest	urbanization	over	the	last	decade	occurred	in	Kerala,	which	is	clearly	
an	outlier	in	the	bottom	right	panels	of	figures	15	and	16.		Nevertheless,	even	with	Kerala	
excluded,	 the	 story	 is	 clear.	 	 Faster	 urbanization	 is	 associated	 with	 greater	 urban	 wage	
growth	relative	to	rural	areas	for	both	genders,	but	especially	for	females.		Moreover,	this	
latter	effect	is	not	driven	merely	by	correlation	between	falling	female	LFP	and	urbanization;	
it	survives	virtually	intact	after	controlling	for	the	relative	change	in	female	LFP.	 	Thus,	 it	
appears	that	in	rapidly	urbanizing	states	the	demand	for	female	labor,	as	reflected	in	their	
wages,	has	been	growing	faster	in	cities	than	in	the	countryside.	
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As	a	final	exercise,	we	turn	to	the	agricultural	commodity	price	boom	of	recent	years	as	an	
explanation	for	the	relative	rise	in	rural	wages.		Jacoby	(2014)	uses	variation	across	Indian	
districts	 in	the	shares	of	different	crops	 in	production	to	show	that	districts	experiencing	
relatively	 higher	 agricultural	 prices	 over	 the	 2004‐09	 period	 also	 saw	 higher	 wages	 for	
unskilled	 labor.	 	 Adapting	 this	 approach	 to	 the	 state‐level	 analysis	 of	 this	 section	 and	
extending	 the	 price	 data	 to	 2011‐12,	 we	 construct	 the	 following	measure	 of	 differential	
agricultural	price	change	
	
∆௨௥∆ܲ஺ ൌ ሺߚ௨஺ െ ߚ௥஺ሻ∑ ݏ௖∆log	݌௖௖ ,	 	 	 	 (10)	
	
where	ߚ௝஺	is	the	initial	(i.e.,	2004‐05)	share	of	labor	in	agriculture	for	a	state	in	sector	(݆ ൌ
ݑ, ݎ),	ݏ௖	is	the	share	of	crop	c	in	the	total	value	of	state	agricultural	production	in	base‐year	
2003‐04,	and	∆log	݌௖	is	the	change	in	log‐price	of	crop	c	between	the	2004‐05	and	2011‐12	
crop	marketing	 years	 for	 the	 18	 top	 field	 crops	 of	 India.7	 	 Intuitively,	 the	 labor	market	
response	to	changes	in	agricultural	prices	is	modulated	by	the	output	share	of	agriculture	in	
the	 overall	 economy	 of	 the	 sector;	 if	 production	 is	 Cobb‐Douglas,	 this	 output	 share	 is	
equivalent	to	the	labor	share.	
	
The	relationship	between	differential	urban‐rural	agricultural	price	changes,	as	reflected	in	
∆௨௥∆ܲ஺,	and	relative	wage	changes,	as	reflected	by	∆௨௥∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௧ሻ෣ ,	is	complicated	by	the	fact	
that	the	agricultural	labor	share	differential	ߚ௨஺ െ ߚ௥஺	affects	both	quantities	independently.		
Referring	 to	 equations	 (4)	 and	 (7),	 one	 can	 see	 that	 ߚ௨஺ െ ߚ௥஺	 and	 ∆௨௥∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௧ሻ෣ 	 are	
mechanically	related.		In	particular,	since	unskilled	workers	shifted	out	of	agriculture	into	
construction	and	other	services	over	the	last	decade,	the	demand	index	for	unskilled	workers	
is	dominated	by	a	weighted	average	of	the	proportion	of	each	of	these	industry’s	share	of	
unskilled	labor,	where	the	weights	are,	essentially,	the	growth	rates	of	employment	in	the	
respective	industries.		In	a	state	where	agriculture	had	a	larger	initial	employment	share,	the	
growth	rate	of	agriculture	employment	tends	to	be	smaller	and,	hence,	there	appears	to	be	a	
greater	 increase	 in	 demand	 for	 unskilled	 labor.	 	 The	 upshot	 is	 that,	 in	 considering	 the	
bivariate	 relationship	 between	 ∆௨௥∆ܲ஺	 and	 ∆௨௥∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௧ሻ෣ ,	 we	 must	 partial	 out	 this	
mechanical	correlation	with	ߚ௨஺ െ ߚ௥஺.	 	Figure	17	thus	plots	 the	residuals	of	∆௨௥∆݈݋݃ሺ పܹ௧ሻ෣ 	
against	those	of	∆௨௥∆ܲ஺	in	regressions	on	ߚ௨஺ െ ߚ௥஺	across	the	14	state‐groups.			Consistent	
with	Jacoby	(2014),	the	figure	shows	that	rural	wages	of	the	unskilled	(males	and	females	
combined)	have	risen	faster	relative	to	urban	wages	in	states	where	the	terms	of	trade	for	
agriculture	have	improved	by	more.			Evidently,	this	is	due	to	the	fact	that	in	states	benefitting	
differentially	from	the	agricultural	commodity	boom,	the	secular	decline	in	agriculture	has	
                                                            
7Equation (10) follows directly from the theoretical model of Jacoby (2014) under the simplifying assumption of no 
nontradable sector and no intermediate inputs. 
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been	attenuated	and,	as	a	result,	the	demand	for	unskilled	labor	has	not	fallen	as	much	due	
to	structural	transformation.	
	
	
Figure	17:	Urban	vs.	rural	wage	changes	and	agricultural	prices	
	
VI. 	Conclusions	
Real	wages	have	risen	across	India	in	the	past	two	decades,	but	the	increase	has	been	greater	
in	rural	areas	and,	especially,	for	unskilled	workers.		Broadly	speaking,	the	changing	wage	
structure	within	 rural	 areas	 has	 been	 driven	 largely	 by	 relative	 supply	 factors,	 such	 as	
increased	 overall	 education	 levels	 and	 falling	 female	 LFP,	 whereas	 the	 changing	 wage	
structure	between	rural	and	urban	areas	has	been	driven	largely	by	shifts	in	employment,	
notably	 into	 unskilled‐intensive	 sectors	 like	 construction.	 	 Notwithstanding	 the	 rural	
construction	 boom,	 the	 recent	 expansion	 of	 the	 national	 public‐works	 program	 (NREG)	
throughout	rural	India	does	not	appear	to	be	associated	with	shifts	in	the	structure	of	wages	
(i.e.,	 to	 the	 advantage	 of	 the	 unskilled)	 over	 the	 last	 decade.	 	 Finally,	 while	 structural	
transformation—the	gradual	movement	of	labor	out	of	agriculture—has	been	the	dominant	
trend	of	the	last	two	decades	in	rural	India,	our	evidence	suggests	that	the	recent	upturn	in	
agriculture’s	 terms	 of	 trade	 may	 have	 muted	 the	 commensurate	 decline	 in	 demand	 for	
unskilled	rural	labor,	contributing	to	growth	in	wages	for	the	rural	unskilled	relative	to	their	
urban	counterparts.	 	
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Appendix	
A. Within	industry	demand	shift	index	
The	within	industry	demand	shift	index	takes	the	form	
∆ܦ௜௦௧௪ ൌ ∑ ேೖೞ೟ேೞ೟ ∆log	ሺ
ே೔ೖೞ೟
ேೖೞ೟ ሻ௞ 	 	 	 	 	 (A.1)	
In	 this	 case,	 the	 first	 term	 is	 the	 initial	 share	of	 industry	k	 in	 total	 sectoral	 employment,	
whereas	the	second	term	is	the	relative	growth	of	group	 i’s	employment	 in	that	 industry.		
Thus,	∆ܦ௜௦௧௪ 	captures	industry‐specific	skill‐upgrading,	an	important	driver	of	the	changing	
wage	 structure	 in	 the	US	 and	 other	 developing	 countries	 over	 recent	 decades	 (Katz	 and	
Autor,	1999).	
If	 the	second	term	in	equation	(A.1)	 is	 the	same	across	 industries	 (industry‐neutral	group	
employment	growth),	then	∆ܦ௜௦௧ௐ =∆ ௜ܵ௦௧,	in	which	case	the	within‐industry	demand	shift	for	a	
particular	demographic	group	is	indistinguishable	from	that	group’s	supply	shift.		In	the	case	
of	India,	∆ܦ௜௦௧ௐ 	and	∆ ௜ܵ௦௧	are	close	to	being	equal	and	this	tight	correlation	carries	over	to	the	
state‐level	 indices,	 as	 shown	 in	 Figure	 A.1.	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 we	 ignore	 within	 industry	
demand	shifts	in	our	analysis.	
Figure	 A.1:	 	 Bivariate	 relationship	 between	 state/group	 supply	 and	 within‐industry	
demand	shifts.	
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B. Additional Figures and Tables 
	
Figure	B.1:		Inter‐censal	change	in	urban	population	share	(2001‐11)	
	
Table B.1:  Harmonization of Industry Classification across Rounds 
     Two digit codes 
Broader Groups     NIC‐1987  NIC‐1998  NIC‐2004  NIC‐2008 
1. Agriculture  Agriculture, hunting and forestry, 
Fishing  00‐06  01‐05  01‐05  01‐03 
  Mining and quarrying  10‐19  10‐14  10‐14  05‐09 
  Manufacturing  20‐39  15‐37  15‐37  10‐33 
2. Mining‐
Manufacturing‐
Utilities  Utilities‐Electricity, gas & water supply  40‐43  40‐41  40‐41  35‐36 
3. Construction  Construction  50‐51  45  45  41‐43 
 
Wholesale, Retail trade and restaurant  60‐69 
50‐55; 1712; 2892;  
8532  50‐55  45‐47; 55‐56 
4. Services  Personal and repair services  96,97  95  95;96  94‐98 
  Transport, storage and communications  70‐75  60‐64; 9309  60‐64  49‐53;58‐63 
5. Professional  Finance, insurance, real estate and 
business services  80‐89  65‐67; 5240; 70‐74  65‐67; 70‐74  64‐68; 77‐82 
  Public admin., sanitary services  90,91  75  75  37‐39; 69‐75 
  Health and medical and social services  93,94  85; 90‐93  85; 90‐93  86‐88; 90‐93 
  Education and research  92  80  80  85 
  International services  98  99  99  99 
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Table	B.2:	Adjustment	of	Consumer	Price	Index	for	small	States	
CPI‐AL	 	 	 	
State/	UT	 NSS	Code	(61st,	64th,	66th)	 State/	UT	to	map	CPI‐AL	from	 NSS	Code	(61st,	64th,	66th)	
Chandigarh	 4	 Haryana	 6	
Delhi	 7	 Haryana	 6	
Uttarakhand	 5	 Uttar	Pradesh	 9	
Jharkhand	 20	 Bihar	 10	
Sikkim	 11	 Assam	 18	
Arunachal	Pradesh	 12	 Assam	 18	
Nagaland	 13	 Assam	 18	
Mizoram	 15	 Assam	 18	
A	&	N	Islands	 35	 West	Bengal	 19	
Chhattisgarh	 22	 MP	 23	
Daman	&	Diu	 25	 Gujarat	 24	
D	&	N	Haveli	 26	 Gujarat	 24	
Goa	 30	 Maharashtra	 27	
Lakshadweep	 31	 Kerala	 32	
Pondicherry	 34	 Tamil	Nadu	 33	
CPI‐IW	 	 	 	
State/	UT	 NSS	Code	(61st,	64th,	66th)	 State/	UT	to	map	CPI‐AL	from	 NSS	Code	(61st,	64th,	66th)	
Uttarakhand	 5	 Uttar	Pradesh	 9	
Sikkim	 11	 Assam	 18	
Arunachal	Pradesh	 12	 Assam	 18	
Nagaland	 13	 Assam	 18	
Manipur	 14	 Assam	 18	
Mizoram	 15	 Assam	 18	
Meghalaya	 17	 Assam	 18	
A	&	N	Islands	 35	 West	Bengal	 19	
Daman	&	Diu	 25	 Gujarat	 24	
D	&	N	Haveli	 26	 Gujarat	 24	
Lakshadweep	 31	 Kerala	 32	
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Table	B.3:		Estimated	Industry	Premia	and	Casual	Labor	Shares	
  
Industry premium  Industry share in total casual 
labor 
Industry  1993‐94  2004‐05  2011‐12  1993‐94  2004‐05  2011‐12 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing  ‐0.22  ‐0.38  ‐0.27  74.28  67.82  54.69 
Construction  0.02  0.11  0.05  7.7  16.43  29.82 
Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities  0.04  0.02  0.06  8.89  8.87  8.73 
Professional  0.26  0.23  0.15  2.37  1.01  0.69 
Services  ‐0.10  ‐0.03  0.00  6.76  5.87  6.08 
Total  0  0  0  100  100  100 
Note:	Industry	premia	sum	to	zero	by	construction.		Industry	share	of	casual	labor	is	the	%	share	(weighted)	of	
each	industry	in	total	casual	labor	force.	
	
	
	
Table	B.4:		Regression	Analysis	with	State	Fixed	Effects	
	 	 2011/12	‐	2004/05	only	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
VARIABLES	 OLS	 OLS	 IV	 IV	
Δsupply	 ‐0.207***	 ‐0.230***	 ‐0.297***	 	
	 (0.027)	 (0.036)	 (0.057)	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Δdemand	 0.145**	 0.204*	 0.318***	 	
	 (0.050)	 (0.101)	 (0.096)	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Δ(Demand‐Supply)	 	 	 	 0.307***	
	 	 	 	 (0.050)	
	 	 	 	 	
Industry	Effect	 ‐0.042	 0.075*	 0.190	 0.190	
	 (0.046)	 (0.036)	 (0.117)	 (0.117)	
	 	 	 	 	
ΔSupply	=	‐	ΔDemand	(p‐value)	 0.30	 0.81	 0.86	 	
Year	FE	 Y	 N	 N	 N	
State	FE	 Y	 Y	 Y	 Y	
Observations	 448	 224	 224	 224	
R‐squared	 0.327	 0.488	 0.435	 0.433	
Notes:		Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	clustered	on	state	(***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1).		Dependent	
variable	in	all	regression	is	mean	log	wage	change	of	demographic	group	in	state.	
